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Abstract
This commentary concerns the significant opportunities which the global economy’s current nearshoring trend offers the Latin
American and Caribbean (LAC) region owing to a US–China decoupling. Yet the region, generally, is woefully unprepared. The
state of the LAC will make or break the peoples’ attempts to exploit the new potential to better themselves. Yet the short-ter-
mist myopia and public policy neglect of politicians is the greatest obstacle to the kind of development the region needs the
most: high-quality FDI enabling educated innovators to push LAC up the rank of global value chains; or else it will be trapped
in middle income, at best.
The future of the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region
now hangs in the balance. LAC needs to find a path to devel-
opment that can prevent its peoples falling farther behind the
rest of the developing world. Seismic world events – the
decoupling of the US and China and the COVID-19 pan-
demic’s acceleration of the digitalization of business – have
opened up a window of opportunity for Latin America to
unseat some Asian countries as the USA’s main suppliers by
‘nearshoring’ some economic activity. Yet the best positioned
region in the world seems the least prepared to turn this
moment to its advantage. This discussion will highlight the
necessity for speedy action to safeguard LAC’s tomorrow and
recommend concrete steps for achieving success.
LAC has withstood some of the hardest impacts of
COVID-19, imperilling both its health and its development,
without receiving any of the attention paid to China, Eur-
ope, and the USA. Analysts forecast a –9% economic con-
traction for 2020 and a per capita income freefall to 2009
levels. The pandemic has asymmetrically hit the most vul-
nerable and worsened a precarious economic outlook in a
region where 25 per cent are poor and 37 per cent risk
becoming poor. It is a vulnerability compounded by impacts
skewed toward the informal sector, which comprises 60 per
cent of the regional economy on average, of which 58 per
cent are vulnerable (US$5.50–13.00 per day) or in poverty
(less than US$5.50 per day) (OECD, 2020).
The nearshoring of global value chains
These drastic figures should surprise no one. LAC has long
been participating notably less than other regions in global
value chains (GVCs) and their far-reaching economic oppor-
tunities (Blyde and Trachtenberg, 2020). Spanning supply
and demand networks that integrate firms, workers, and
consumers across all regions, GVCs underlie local as well as
global development. They are the constituent motifs orga-
nizing world trade, creating unprecedented access for devel-
oping countries to developed and developing markets. GVCs
make up, however, a complicated and fragile, perhaps
overextended web of production that opens and shuts win-
dows of opportunity treacherously fast.
One very treacherous emergence is the US–China trade
war now decoupling the world’s top two economies, selec-
tively reducing the density of bilateral technology and trade
linkages (Wyne, 2020). Beijing had begun decoupling from
the US even before; now it is stepping up the pace. Some
Chinese observers reckoned too-close linkages a develop-
ment liability, especially at technology’s cutting edge (Wei,
2019).
The decoupling and COVID-19 shocks have exposed the
vast scale, yet the thin fragility of the interdependence of
producers of multiple continents on consumers elsewhere.
Multinational firms that had previously offshored their pro-
duction are forecast to ‘reshore’ it back home to their own
countries (Ashby, 2016) or ‘nearshore’ it geographically.
McKinsey estimate 16-26 per cent of total global trade
worth US$2.9–4.6 trillion could be reshored, nearshored, or
shifted to alternative offshores in the short to medium term
(Lund et al., 2020).
US firms in particular have been inclined to nearshore for
better regional coordination under changing production
dynamics. The latest Reshoring Index indicates US imports
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of Chinese manufactures declined 17 per cent in 2019 (US
$90 billion), while imports from Mexico rose US$13 billion
(Van den Bossche et al., 2020). Some sectors are unlikely to
be re-/nearshored anytime soon; for example, Asian suppli-
ers of electronics are entrenched by vast economies of scale
and the prohibitive costs of duplication elsewhere. But two-
thirds of automotive firms are planning to nearshore, and in
the consumer and packaged goods sector they are moving
to simplify product portfolios and regionalize supply chains.
And construction and engineering firms are resorting to
dual sourcing to reduce supply disruption exposure (Lund
et al., 2020).
These trends continuing will offer immense opportunities
for LAC to reset its place in North American GVCs, which
Asia had taken away in the 1990s. LAC is nearer, its labour
is cheaper than in the US, and intellectual property risk is
less than Asia’s (Piatanesi and Arauzo-Carod, 2019). This
unique opportunity will not last; LAC’s public and private
sectors must exploit it now. And nearshoring can only boost;
alone it cannot suffice. Rapid regional improvements in edu-
cation, productivity, competitiveness, connectivity, integra-
tion alone can attract and/or substitute for quality foreign
direct investment (FDI); transient windfalls have never led
LAC up the value chain and out of its endless labour-inten-
sive, low-income development trap.
GVCs and development: lessons from the region
Participation in GVCs is nothing new for LAC, whose coun-
tries have responded to openings before, in contrasting
ways. Costa Rica and Mexico exemplify the do’s and don’ts
of capitalizing on GVC reorganization, joining US value
chains with differing visions that serve as regional bench-
marks. Mexican politicians felt obliged to steer their econ-
omy to the automotive sector to create employment, but
Costa Rica preferred ICT investment to move up the value-
added ladder to knowledge-intensive, higher-valued produc-
tion (Lee et al., 2020).
Ironically, Mexico has always had enormous nearshoring
potential. Its robust intellectual property regime and elec-
tronic manufacturing experience make it attractive to tech
giants. The UMCA trade agreement with the US and Canada,
successor to NAFTA, facilitates this. Yet even decades of
experience with FDI have yielded decidedly mixed out-
comes. Since the 1970s and with NAFTA’s boost since 1994,
Mexico has been fetching labour-intensive export produc-
tion. This model represented 3 per cent of domestic GDP
and 20 per cent of manufacturing GDP by 2017. From 1980
to 2017, the sectoral labour force grew 650 per cent.
Higher-value supply chains, unfortunately, are not relocating
to Mexico; on the contrary, the domestic value-added trend
is down (Crossa and Ebner, 2020). Mexico and all of the LAC
region must facilitate entrepreneurship. The latest World
Bank report, Doing Business 2020, ranked not even one LAC
country among the top 50 whose public policies unburden
entrepreneurs (World Bank, 2020a).
Costa Rica became a hub of electronic assembly and inno-
vation after 1996, when it won the worldwide competition
to host Intel’s semiconductor operations by offering quality
human capital and a package of concessions from initial tax
exemptions to improved infrastructure provision (Bailey and
Warby, 2019). Costa Rica shows that local comparative
advantages can attract quality FDI. In 2014, Intel moved
assembly and testing to Asia, leaving engineering and
design in Costa Rica, a repositioning that drove it up the
value chain by adding more domestic value to exports, rais-
ing average wages, and potentiating productivity linkages to
innovation and expertise spillover to other sectors. The
International Labour Organization (ILO) said Costa Rica is
ending its dependence on timeworn, low-skilled, mostly
agricultural GVCs like bananas, sugar, coffee, and textiles for
an economy thriving on high qualifications and quality jobs,
with robust integration into high-value GVCs (Monge-
Gonzalez, 2017).
What can LAC do?
Mexico compared to Costa Rica shows that LAC must
develop domestic capabilities to add higher value to all its
productive activities. LAC overall is like Mexico, but isolated
pockets of excellence like Costa Rica dot the region and can
be capitalised on if sound public policies prevailed, like pub-
lic investment in training and earnest commitment to R&D.
Such reforms will help countries like Brazil, overdependent
on commodity exports and stuck in a middle-income trap,
repositioning them from commodity production to higher
value added wares (Paus, 2020). How should LAC renovate
its development strategy? Here follow five interrelated rec-
ommendations which the region urgently needs to act on.
(1) LAC must focus like a laser on productivity: LAC’s
labour productivity growth slowed to a crawl (0.4 per cent)
from 2013 to 2018, the least-improved emerging market
and developing economy (EMDE) anywhere (World Bank,
2020b). The public sector must invest in technology, espe-
cially digitalisation to raise productivity. Public-private part-
nerships are needed to rationalise FDI, combined with a
determination to increase investment in R&D, which is abys-
mally low. Private spending on R&D tends to follow public,
as businesses move in to claim their share of the largesse,
but governments are not there to be exploited. Subsidised
firms must be held to correspondingly raise their stake in
innovation. This is how it is done in the North’s advanced
economies (Mazzucato, 2013; Zu~niga-Vicente et al., 2014),
and in a few cases in LAC too, as Chile illustrates (Guimon
et al., 2018).
(2) LAC must find new ways to educate and train on the
job: performance is poor on international standardized tests,
compared to the OECD and Asia, reflecting LAC’s low-quality
education – well documented as one reason why labour
productivity shows near-zero growth (Mendoza, 2020). An
obsolete education establishment unresponsive to business
demand burdens young labour market entrants. Alternatives
to education-as-usual must adapt to the Fourth Industrial
Revolution. The best place to look is at advanced and most-
successful developing economies. LAC must learn how to
learn from its betters (Garcia, 2020).
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(3) The region must integrate: intra-regional trade and
complementarity could integrate LAC into better GVCs, yet
regional trade openness is lacking. Dependency is inevitable
if intra-regional trade ekes out just 15.5 per cent of total
exports, near the lowest in the world (ECLAC, 2019). If only
intermediate manufacturing content is added in, bilateral,
sub-regional and regional trade agreements can then insert
more value added into GVCs, opening up global markets to
small and medium-sized enterprises to reap the multiplier
effects on employment and welfare. The prospect of a hemi-
spheric trading bloc of 1 billion consumers could make LAC
very appealing to US firms wondering where to nearshore. It
will require mature political will to critically revise existing
models to answer today’s realities, while respecting ideologi-
cal differences (Moreno, 2020).
(4) LAC sorely needs infrastructure: infrastructure is the
hardware of meaningful integration, but LAC has some of
the world’s worst, even while elites obsess over free trade
agreements (FTAs). Bilateral FTAs do little for the region
without intra-regional connectivity to move the production
factors and serve the consumer demand that generates
wealth. Infrastructure is essential to purposes besides
resource extraction for China or the Global North (Mendez,
2019). LAC cannot continue to invest a mere 3 per cent of
GDP annually, compared to over 7 per cent in Asia. The
World Bank and LAC development banks are unanimous
that LAC must at least double its investment in roads,
energy, telecommunications, drinking water, education,
healthcare, and other goods, both public and marketed
(Garcia, 2020).
(5) Support LAC’s multi-national enterprises (MNEs) or
‘Multilatinas’ in creating regional wealth: what LAC needs
most is ‘regional champions’ like the national champions of
South Korea or China, who can move beyond just serving
and supplying foreign MNEs, to eventually compete with
them in the global economy. But they must be ‘unleashed’
to create income through intra-regional trade growth (For-
nes and Mendez, 2018), to furnish the commercial basis for
ever higher value added. The problem LAC must solve is
this: that World Bank experts find that Multilatinas are not
innovative, poorly managed, and less productive than other
regions’ multinationals (Lederman et al., 2014).
Multilatinas must completely revamp their commercial
strategies. Dependency on extraction of natural resources is
poison. Exploitative foreign capital must be replaced by
home-grown determination to raise productivity. In this,
public policy will play a pivotal role, especially fostering pro-
ductive factors tributary to growth like entrepreneurship,
innovation, human capital (Bianchi et al., 2019) and proac-
tion above all, not ma~nana.
Conclusion
This policy discussion has endeavoured to warn LAC against
repeating its worst mistakes. Its recommendations stress
public-private partnership and collaboration, because the
reshoring LAC could attract without the constructive role of
the state will have no long-lasting impact on development.
Public policy concertation that would dare support
entrepreneurship must build up a network of cross-sectoral
strategic managers who know how to couple private inter-
ests to the national interest in the medium to long run
(Mazzucato, 2013). LAC must wilfully choose innovation,
skills-improvement and sectoral diversification as a way of
life until it becomes ‘business as usual’ in LAC.
LAC may put off acting till ma~nana no longer. Short-term
political objectives will not do. The scorched-earth politics of
discrediting at all costs the achievements of political rivals
vitiates LAC public policy. Every new administration angles
its rear-view mirror to accentuate its predecessors’ negatives,
mindlessly junking their best achievements. No one builds
political consensus to underpin long-term development
strategy. Procrastinating its own future has been LAC’s
downfall. It must embrace self-denial for the sake of long-
term goals now.
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